Responsible for Continuity and Consistency of Perceptions Among Perceivers

Abstract

Theories of philosophy of perception are too simplifying. Direct realism and representationalism, for example, are philosophical theories of perception about the nature of the perceived object and its location. It is common sense to say that we directly perceive, through our senses, physical objects together with their properties. However, if perceptual experience is representational, it only appears that we directly perceive the represented physical objects. Despite psychological studies concerning the role of memory in perception, what these two philosophical theories do not explicate are the continuity of the external describable object and the role of memory in perceiving the continuity, difference, break or ending. Using empirical evidence of particular cases and the hypothetico-deductive model, this research article analyses how one is able to perceive the continuity of same things. The early stages of perceptual process are not sufficient for the perception of continuity. Empirical evidence of memory disorders shows that persons with a memory disorder do not perceive the same thing or the familiar place they previously saw and now experience or remember what they are thinking about, even if the object, the place or the person has remained the same. I will argue that the perception of continuity requires memory. In fact, observation indicates how the memory runs at the same time, when the object is seen over time. This fact implies the memory system's essential role for perceiving the continuity of the same things.

Notes

1. The focus of analytic philosophy on language, in my opinion, leads to great simplifications in reality. For example, we cannot know what a perception is by thinking. It is also unclear how the persistence of observation or thinking is identified: when does an observation or idea break? The assumption is that material chunks continue in the reality, even when we do not observe or think about them. The theory of mental files does not at least add clarity to these questions.

2. Simply put, the hypothetico-deductive model means a description of scientific method. The simple view of the scientific method insists us to form conjecture (hypothesis), deduce predictions from the hypothesis and test or look for evidence (observations) that conflict with these predictions in order to disprove hypothesis. On the other hand, an event may have many causes, not just one cause, and thus the model is simple way to describe scientific research. Moreover, the predictions are not the logical consequences from the hypotheses.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, University of Turku, Turku, Finland

   Mika Suojanen

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Correspondence to Mika Suojanen.

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Suojanen, M. On Perceiving Continuity: the Role of Memory in the Perception of the Continuity of the Same Things. Philosophia 48, 1979–1995 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00187-5

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• Received: 03 December 2018

• Revised: 03 December 2018

• Accepted: 04 February 2020

• Published: 15 February 2020

• Issue Date: November 2020

• DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00187-5

Keywords

• Phenomenon
• Object of perception
• Experience
• Memory
• Perception of continuity
• Temporality

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